For full text search please use the '?' prefix. e.g. ? Onboarding

Hong Kong Fire 2025 Investigation

Parent: Hong Kong Fire 2025

Melted green mesh on Wang Fuk Court towers; bamboo scaffold remains largely intact.

Photo: Mak Yenting/RFI.

Findings and Evidence

  • Materials evidence: Police collected 20 netting samples across Wang Tai, Wang Do, Wang Yan, Wang Chi; 7 failed flammability tests, with harder-to-reach samples more likely to fail, raising mixing/switching suspicions (NBC/AP, RTHK). ICAC says contractors bought ~2,300 rolls of non-compliant mesh at HK$54/roll after typhoon damage, then 115 rolls of compliant mesh at HK$100/roll installed at scaffold bases to pass spot checks (news.gov.hk).
  • Foam/polystyrene: Panels sealed windows (incl. elevator lobbies), accelerating spread; melted at >500C and blew out windows (Reuters/CNN).
  • Alarms and systems: Post-fire inspections found alarms non-functional across all eight towers; some residents say alarms switched off during works (CNN/BBC). A Wang Cheong resident’s door-cam footage shows no alarm and smoke engulfing the corridor within 8 minutes (2:52–3:00 p.m.) before he fled by elevator (HK01).
  • Fire spread and access: Initial outbreak on lower exterior of Wang Cheong House; spread to Wang Tai, Wang Shing, Wang Yan; Wang Chi largely spared (Guardian/Reuters). Interior temps reported above 500C; falling scaffolding and debris hindered rescues (CNN/Reuters/AP).
  • Resident account: Survivor Yip Ka-kui described hearing bamboo poles “explode” and mesh igniting before foam-sealed windows trapped his wife Bai Shui Lin, who died after warning neighbors (CBS News).
  • Testing/documentation gaps: Pulse HK reports “testing reports” posted at other sites by contractor Hong Yip were merely mainland factory certificates (e.g., Binzhou center) that can be printed freely; another cited “National Labor Protection QC Center (Beijing)” was confirmed “100% fake.” HK01 similarly found multiple estates (e.g., Cheung Sha Wan Yee Kak, Chai Wan Fung Wah) displaying Binzhou/Beijing certificates for Shandong Chenxu nets; the Beijing lab said any post-2019 report using “監督” was “100% fake,” and numbers with “發證質檢(網)” were bogus (HK01). Expert hong-kong-fire-2025.people#whistleblowers (Private) stresses only HOKLAS/CNAS lab sampling after delivery counts; industry veteran says temporary materials like scaffold nets rely on self-checks by the site’s Authorized Person, creating loopholes unless consultants enforce sampling and verify suppliers/labs (Pulse HK).
  • External expert assessment: Grenfell Tower inquiry expert José Luis Torero (UCL) says Wang Fuk Court and Grenfell shared vertical spread driven by combustible exterior materials and smoke overrunning corridors/stairs; bamboo/netting may have aided but likely not the main driver versus foam/polystyrene cladding and channel-flow between closely spaced towers. He frames the disaster as a systemic competency failure across contractors, engineers, management, and regulators, calling for a Grenfell-level technical inquiry into materials, spacing assumptions, compartmentation, and smoke-path failure (Yahoo/信報).
  • Policy and regulatory actions: Mainland authorities ordered a nationwide inspection of high-rises—especially under renovation with bamboo/wood scaffolding and non-flame-retardant nets—while Hong Kong said 7 of 20 netting samples failed and signaled a gradual shift toward metal scaffolding without blaming bamboo alone (WSJ).
  • Oversight fallout: Officials suspended 28 other renovation projects run by the same contractor while citing cost-cutting mesh swaps after a typhoon; analysts warn the safety gaps and bid-rigging risks extend across Hong Kong’s high-rise stock (AP).
  • Scene documentation: On Nov 30 the Disaster Victim Identification Unit entered the towers to map interiors and recover remains; widely shared photos show flats reduced to ash with exposed rebar, blackened walls, and charred fixtures, highlighting the scale of destruction across seven of eight blocks (The Standard).

Burned interior at Wang Fuk Court showing collapsed plaster, ash-covered floors, and charred fixtures — DVIU survey photo.

Insurance and Liability

  • Taiping Hong Kong (insurer for Wang Fuk Court renovation and estate policies) paid a first batch of nine home-insurance claims totaling HK$5.372m on Dec 1; the estate’s property insurance carries a reported HK$20b sum insured with third-party liability cover up to HK$200m per incident, backed by reinsurance partners including Qianhai Re, China Re P&C, and Taiping Re (Sina).
  • Coverage in place includes construction all-risk, employees’ compensation, owners’ corporation third-party liability, property all-risk/public liability, and some household/helper policies; industry estimates expect payouts to approach policy limits, with reinsurers sharing the exposure (Sina).

Tender Irregularities and Oversight Gaps

  • Mandatory Building Inspection Scheme (MBIS): The Wang Fuk Court renovation was commissioned under the 2012 MBIS; after the 2023 tender the price jumped from an estimated HK$140m to HK$330m (RFI).
  • Budget escalation: SCMP reports internal documents showing Wang Fuk Court’s budget rising from HK$152m (Sep 2023 analysis) to HK$336m after adopting the most expensive option, including full mosaic removal/repaving and added drainage/fire upgrades; experts call the renovation sector “rotten” with bid-rigging/collusion and urge an overhaul (SCMP).
  • Alleged bid-rigging and interference: Residents reported suspected triad-linked individuals blocking dissenting owners from meetings; a new owners’ corporation replaced the old one in Sep 2024 after the contract was already signed (RFI).
  • Academic/press analysis of collusion: Points Media cites a 2022 paper (Leung Tsang Tsui, Singapore Economic Review) using the now-closed FactWire database to show the Mandatory Building Inspection Scheme cut owners’ bargaining power, raising renovation bids ~40% and fostering collusion; Prestige Construction & Engineering Ltd. (宏業建築工程有限公司; aka Hong Yip Construction Engineering) was among the most active firms (104 bids, with unusually high/low rankings). Article notes pro-Beijing Ta Kung Pao removed a piece calling Prestige a “常勝將軍,” and quotes anonymous consultants alleging “招標妥” advisors take kickbacks, eroding oversight (Points Media).
  • Property management role: Bloomberg reports ISS A/S shares fell up to 11% on Dec 2 after SCMP noted its unit EastPoint Properties acted as Wang Fuk Court property manager. ISS says it only handled administrative tendering for the Incorporated Owners via an e-tender platform, made no recommendations, and welcomes the judge-led independent committee (Bloomberg).
  • URA scoring controversy: HKEJ says contractor Prestige Construction & Engineering Ltd. (宏業建築工程有限公司; aka Hong Yip Construction Engineering) received a 100/100 “project management” rating under the Urban Renewal Authority’s Building Rehab Company Registration Scheme. URA admits the display could mislead the public into thinking it is an overall contractor grade rather than a system-integrity check; the scheme also did not require declarations of site-safety convictions. URA plans to revise the audit scope/methods/display and to review its “招標妥” tender-support service to ensure consultant technical scoring is based on verifiable data and to reduce corruption/bid-rigging risks (HKEJ).
  • ICAC complaints and scope concerns: Residents told i-Cable they tipped ICAC before the contract was signed but were asked for evidence and saw no probe until after the fire; a July 2024 owners’ briefing featured a lawyer warning owners they would bear legal liability if a leadership change voided the contract, discouraging a halt. The contractor reportedly runs repairs at 11 estates; other estates paused work and removed scaffold netting after the blaze while consultants demanded proof of flame-retardant materials and stricter site no-smoking enforcement (i-Cable).
  • Complaints ignored: During works, residents complained to multiple departments about flammable mesh and foam sealing windows but “got nowhere”; disqualified pro-democracy district councillors who tried to assist were expelled for lacking official status (RFI).
  • Historical context: FactWire’s 2017 database (3,000 bids across 220 estates) highlighted systemic bid-rigging patterns in building maintenance—low consultant fees, market concentration, irregular pricing—mirroring current suspicions FactWire.
  • Demands for action: hong-kong-fire-2025.people#whistleblowers (Private) posted on Nov 26 urging immediate net inspections at other estates (e.g., Sui Wo, On Kay), evacuation/rehousing of ~3,000 households, criminal probes into fake netting documents, accountability for regulators, an Independent Commission of Inquiry, and travel bans/detentions for key IO members/contractors to prevent evidence flight (Facebook).

Arrests and Probes

  • Manslaughter: 15 arrested on gross negligence related to renovation works; early arrests included contractor directors/consultant; later arrests expanded to scaffolding subcontractors and intermediary.
  • ICAC: Probe arrested 8 linked to renovation project (directors, project managers, subcontractors, intermediary); total 12 arrests reported including consultants, contractors, scaffolding heads (news.gov.hk).
  • Materials: Police and officials allege flammable mesh/foam used; some netting initially certified compliant; ongoing verification of actual materials used on-site.
  • Non-statutory review: Chief Executive John Lee announced a judge-led committee (non-statutory), pledging administrative directives for evidence access; statutory Independent Commission of Inquiry was rejected despite civic calls (RFI).
  • Contractor fallout: Hung Ngai Architects Ltd. (宏毅建築師) — consultant on Wang Fuk Court and other estates — reportedly announced an immediate suspension/termination of all business after ICAC arrests; owners’ groups at Aberdeen Centre Phase 1 and On Kay Court voted to end their Hung Ngai contracts (on.cc).
  • Parallel estate alarm: At Ngon Kei Court (Ngon Kei Yuen) on Dec 1, contractor Wai Lei Construction flame-tested scaffold-net samples from multiple floors; some ignited instantly. Consultant Hung Ngai (same as Wang Fuk Court) attributed it to glue drips, but residents called for replacing the consultant despite HK$150m repair costs; management blocked additional media sampling and called police (HKEJ).

Open Questions

  • Certification vs. installed materials: extent of material swapping; chain of custody for mesh/foam procurement.
  • Alarm status pre-fire: whether systems were intentionally disabled during works and by whom.
  • Regulatory oversight: adequacy of 16 prior inspections and enforcement actions before November 2025.

Official Statements and Gaps

  • John Lee (Dec 2 presser) acknowledged systemic deficiencies, promised reforms and accountability, and said fires occur globally; condemned “hostile” acts exploiting the tragedy. Deferred on scaffold sampling accuracy while citing ongoing Buildings Department checks (InMediaHK).
  • Eight reform questions (John Lee): construction safety requirements/maintenance; conflicts of interest and collusion across project stages; completeness of safety standards and testing; roles and accountability of regulators (government and professionals); risks of corruption/bid-rigging and tender violations; fire-system supervision and responsibility; attribution of liability for the blaze; adequacy of current penalties (RFI).
  • Bamboo scapegoating dispute: Mourning visitors and experts argued bamboo scaffolding was not the spread driver; on-site placards read “要检讨嘅唔系竹棚 而系个制度” (“The problem to review isn’t bamboo, it’s the system”). Development Bureau later said its metal-scaffold roadmap was misread as blaming bamboo; PolyU’s Xinyan Huang apologized for Channel 4 remarks and said bamboo’s role needs systematic study (RFI/PolyU).
  • Bamboo vs. mesh: Residents’ experiments circulated online showing bamboo charring while scaffold nets burned to ash; ABC noted bamboo frames survived while nets were destroyed, reinforcing suspicions that non-compliant mesh fueled rapid spread (ABC).

Prior Warnings

  • Jason Poon (Pan Zhuohong) flagged non-compliant netting via videos/emails on 2024-05-17; warning video circulated (Facebook).
  • Resident complaints in Sep 2024 to the Labor Department about flammable netting and foam boards; department initially said netting not regulated, later cited contractor certificates after 16 inspections and issued notices/prosecutions (NYT).
Backlinks